Ana Covarrubias Velasco, La política mexicana hacia Cuba a principios de siglo: de la no intervención a la protección de los derechos humanos.

Covarrubias plantea que el cambio principal de la política de México hacia Cuba en los últimos 12 años ha sido el abandono de uno de los pilares de la relación bilateral, la no intervención, a favor de la promoción de la democracia y los derechos humanos. Su artículo presenta los sexenios de Carlos Salinas de Gortari y Ernesto Zedillo como el periodo de transición, definido por una tensión entre la continuidad y el cambio en la política mexicana. La continuidad, expresada en el apoyo a la no intervención en asuntos cubanos, fue evidente en la posición del gobierno mexicano ante la Ley Torricelli y la Helms-Burton, así como en las Cumbres Iberoamericanas hasta 1999. El cambio, por otro lado, se ilustra con los encuentros de autoridades del gobierno mexicano con exiliados cubanos o miembros de la disidencia en Cuba. El cambio, que alcanzó al discurso en 1999, se explica por la situación interna en México durante el gobierno de Zedillo, caracterizada por la “democratización”. La nueva política mexicana hacia Cuba ha sido más evidente durante el sexenio de Vicente Fox. El gobierno mexicano se ha abstenido o ha votado a favor de resoluciones que invitan al gobierno cubano a respetar los derechos humanos y las libertades civiles, y ha adoptado un lenguaje muy claro consistente con una política exterior general que identifica la promoción de la democracia y la protección de los derechos humanos como prioridades. Ante este cambio, el gobierno cubano reaccionó inicialmente mediante mensajes que subrayaban la validez de la no intervención, pero fue más agresivo cuando Castro decidió hacer pública la conversación telefónica que mantuvo con el presidente Fox con motivo de la Conferencia sobre la Financiación para el Desarrollo que se llevó a cabo en Monterrey. Covarrubias concluye que, a pesar de la transformación evidente en la política mexicana, persiste una continuidad en términos de lo que fue por muchos años la relación bilateral: Cuba sigue teniendo un valor simbólico para México al haberse convertido en la oportunidad para reforzar su imagen democrática.

Cristina Warren, La política de Canadá hacia Cuba: evolución del compromiso constructivo.

Ante las condiciones de Cuba tras el colapso de la Unión Soviética y los cambios en el sistema internacional, el gobierno canadiense de Jean Chrétien quiso contribuir a lo que pensó que sería la transformación impostergable de la isla en una economía abierta y un sistema político de instituciones representativas, en el que se respetaran los derechos humanos. Warren sostiene que el diseño de esta política de compromiso constructivo fue resultado de la nueva estrategia hemisférica del gobierno liberal, que buscaba un mayor acercamiento con América Latina y más independencia con respecto a la política exterior estadounidense. Además, dicha política fue posible gracias a la buena disposición de la opinión pública canadiense y al hecho de que no existiera una comunidad de exiliados capaz de impedir el acercamiento con el gobierno cubano. El compromiso constructivo consistió en apoyo diplomático a Cuba, el fomento del comercio y la inversión, y un mayor intercambio cultural. Igualmente, hubo una serie de apoyos económicos y sociales, en los que participaron también ong e iglesias canadienses para, entre otras cosas, asesorar al gobierno cubano en la reforma económica y en materia de derechos humanos y gobernabilidad. La creciente cerrazón económica y política del gobierno de Castro, sin embargo, marcó los límites del compromiso constructivo y, ante una opinión pública que cuestionaba la eficacia de esa política, el gobierno canadiense reconsideró su postura y limitó algunos de los programas de ayuda e intercambio con la isla, así como su apoyo diplomático. Warren concluye que Cuba no representa más un interés prioritario ni particular del gobierno, el sector empresarial o incluso ong canadienses, y el lugar que llegue a ocupar en la política exterior del país dependerá en última instancia de la importancia que se otorgue a América Latina en su conjunto.

Claude Heller, La cuestión cubana en los foros multilaterales.

A pesar de la expulsión del gobierno cubano de la oea en 1962, Cuba sigue siendo materia de discusión tanto en ese organismo como en otros foros regionales y en la onu. Después de hacer una breve revisión histórica del tratamiento del caso cubano en la oea, el autor establece cómo el tema volvió a tener presencia en los noventa. La Ley Helms-Burton obligó a los países de la región a pronunciarse al respecto, y tanto el Grupo de Río como la oea emitieron declaraciones y resoluciones de condena a la aplicación extraterritorial de las leyes y en defensa de la libertad de comercio e inversión en el hemisferio. Por otro lado, el secretario general, César Gaviria, sugirió que la comunidad interamericana debería tener un papel más activo para contribuir a la apertura económica y política de Cuba. La onu se convirtió también en escenario del debate cuando en 1987 los Estados Unidos promovieron en la Comisión de Derechos Humanos una resolución de condena al gobierno cubano por la situación de tales derechos en la isla, resolución que ha sido presentada anualmente por distintos países desde entonces. Por su parte, Cuba ha utilizado también a las Naciones Unidas para condenar las leyes extraterritoriales. En general, el resultado de la consideración del caso cubano en los organismos multilaterales ha sido la división entres los países miembros en cuanto a si se debe o no “presionar” al gobierno cubano para su apertura. Heller argumenta que la discusión refleja en última instancia el conflicto entre los Estados Unidos y Cuba, y que los pronunciamientos y las resoluciones que se han adoptado no han logrado sus objetivos, ni han modificado las posiciones de ambos países. Es decir, en esos foros se mantiene también el impasse entre La Habana y Washington.

Mark Falcoff, Presente y futuro en las relaciones Estados Unidos-Cuba: un ejercicio de análisis y especulación.

La ausencia de relaciones diplomáticas formales entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos por 40 años merece sin duda una explicación. En su artículo, Mark Falcoff aborda esta situación tan peculiar a partir de cinco factores que, en su opinión, han determinado la política estadounidense hacia Cuba: la inercia, los derechos de propiedad, los resentimientos históricos, los valores básicos y la política interna. La inercia se refiere desde luego a la perpetuación de la política estadounidense hacia Cuba, pese a la creación de las Secciones de Interés en Washington y La Habana, y a la firma de varios acuerdos entre los dos gobiernos. Los derechos de propiedad, en segundo lugar, seguirán representando una dificultad, profundizada por la Ley Helms-Burton, en tanto no se encuentre la fórmula para una indemnización aceptable para las dos partes. Los resentimientos históricos se explican, desde luego, por la relación tan complicada que ha existido entre los dos países, que va más allá de la Revolución de 1959, y que el gobierno de Castro de alguna manera recupera. Los valores fundamentales siguen siendo motivo de discrepancia: no se trata sólo de la oposición entre el comunismo y la democracia, los derechos humanos y el libre mercado, sino de la hegemonía estadounidense. Finalmente, la comunidad cubano-estadounidense es sin duda un elemento fundamental para explicar la política interna. Sin embargo, tanto esta comunidad como la opinión pública estadounidense, e incluso algunos sectores dentro del gobierno, han comenzado a adoptar una actitud más abierta con respecto a Cuba. Inevitablemente, Cuba y los Estados Unidos tendrán que reestablecer relaciones en el futuro, y Falcoff concluye considerando esta eventualidad.

Susan Kaufmann Purcell, La Ley Helms-Burton y el embargo estadounidense contra Cuba.

Purcell analiza las posiciones más comunes en relación con el embargo comercial impuesto por los Estados Unidos a Cuba, en particular, la Ley Helms-Burton. Por un lado, hay quienes afirman que el embargo no ha cumplido su objetivo de derrocar al gobierno de Fidel Castro y proponen una política de compromiso constructivo. De levantarse el embargo, la sociedad cubana estaría en contacto con los valores estadounidenses y dejaría de creer a su propio gobierno, y la economía de la isla se diversificaría más. Por el otro lado, los partidarios de las sanciones consideran que el compromiso constructivo fortalecería de hecho a la dictadura cubana, al proveer al régimen de Castro de los recursos que necesita para sobrevivir y evitar así que el pueblo se levante en su contra. La autora señala que la apertura limitada de la economía cubana ha seguido a momentos de crisis y que, siempre que ésta ha funcionado bien, el gobierno de Castro ha emprendido aventuras en el extranjero perjudiciales para los intereses estadounidenses. Purcell anota que en última instancia es difícil evaluar cualquiera de las dos interpretaciones por la falta de datos confiables y porque la discusión está tan permeada por consideraciones ideológicas que, aun cuando los datos existieran, se llegaría a distintas conclusiones a partir de la misma información. Sin embargo, concluye que la Helms-Burton se mantendrá en el futuro previsible y que es poco probable que el presidente Bush relaje su posición con respecto a Cuba después del 11 de septiembre de 2001, dada la relación de Castro con las farc y con el presidente de Venezuela. El embargo y la Helms-Burton no han tenido éxito en derrocar a Castro o en provocar un colapso económico en la isla, pero han contribuido a contener de manera constante al régimen cubano.

Joaquín Roy, Las dos leyes Helms-Burton: contraste de la actitud de los Estados Unidos ante la Unión Europea y ante Cuba.

El artículo trata dos temas principales: el Entendimiento entre los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea sobre la Ley Helms-Burton y lo que Roy denomina la Doctrina Helms-Burton. En el primer caso, el autor señala que la ue ha criticado al gobierno cubano por la violación de los derechos humanos en la isla, pero que también se ha opuesto a las medidas unilaterales adoptadas por los Estados Unidos, como en el caso de la Helms-Burton. En este sentido, la ue decidió denunciar esta ley ante la omc, a lo que los Estados Unidos respondieron sosteniendo que dicha denuncia no procedía, al reconocerse que no se trataba de un asunto comercial, sino político. Los Estados Unidos y la ue llegaron a un Entendimiento, mediante el cual el gobierno estadounidense se comprometió a presionar al Congreso para relajar el título III y eliminar el IV de la ley, mientras que la ue aceptó desincentivar las inversiones en las propiedades cuestionadas, apoyar la democratización de Cuba y retirar su demanda ante la omc, entre otras cosas. El Entendimiento no estuvo libre de críticas en los Estados Unidos ni en la ue, pero se convirtió en un ejemplo de negociaciones diplomáticas y fue posible gracias a que el de Cuba no era un caso lo suficientemente importante como para provocar una guerra comercial entre los dos gigantes. Por otro lado, Roy argumenta que la Helms-Burton puede entenderse como una doctrina, pues incluye toda una serie condiciones políticas para levantar el embargo que, de hecho, implican determinar las características de un futuro gobierno en Cuba: desde luego, no podrá participar en él ningún miembro de la familia Castro, deberá haber elecciones abiertas en las que compitan múltiples partidos políticos independientes y que sean supervisadas por la onu y la oea, y habrá de establecerse un poder judicial independiente, entre muchas otras. Con base en esta influencia política que los Estados Unidos pretenden tener,  Roy traza una línea de continuidad con la Doctrina Monroe y la Enmienda Platt, y demuestra cómo la Ley Helms-Burton se convierte, de hecho, en un asunto político interno de Cuba.

Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba en las Américas: ancla y viraje.

Domínguez considers the olas (Latin American Solidarity Organization) -a good example of what the Cuban revolutionary policy toward the region was during the 1960’s- as a starting point to identify four “waves” of change in Latin America at the end of the 1990’s, and explores their relative impact on Cuba’s domestic affairs.  These “waves” are: democratization, an increasing economic liberalization, an improvement in relations with the United States, and the rapid transformation of the region’s cultural life.  Domínguez argues that while the economic and, to a lesser extent, the democratic “waves” had certain impact on Cuba, they did not produce decisive transformations.  The economic reform was nothing more than a survival strategy and although Cuba was able to diversify its dependence, it was a negative kind of diversification.  In the political realm, the ultimate goal of the Cuban government was to resist democratization pressures, though it had occasionally allowed public debates.  On the other hand, relations with the United States improved only in security issues –migration and drug-trafficking being areas of cooperation.  As to culture, Cuba still had a “seductive spell,” although no more as a revolutionary “hub.”  Domínguez concludes that the Cuban government was ultimately determined to resist any foreign influence on the regime, even at the cost of undermining its economic and political relations with the region’s countries.  As in the past –though in a different way–, Cuba still represents an exceptional case among Latin American countries, since it has not been fully involved in the “waves” of change.

Marifeli Pérez-Stable, Cuba, ¿sucesión o transición?  

The article explores how the Cuban elite achieved political reconstruction amid threats of collapse of the regime in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall’s downfall.  Furthermore, it is expected that political renewal will lead to a relay that does not entail a democratic transition after Fidel Castro’s death.  Pérez-Stable describes the policies that were implemented in the 1990’s, when the Cuban regime’s main goal was survival.  The government implemented an economic reform that involved legalizing the use of U.S. dollars, liberalizing agricultural cooperatives, authorizing self-employment, and welcoming foreign investment.  However, the same pattern was not used in politics, where only a few cosmetic measures were taken, including admission of Catholics to the ccp, direct vote to elect the National Assembly of People’s Power, and the constitutional recognition of the economy’s mixed sector.  The costs of a wide-ranging political reform would have been unacceptable, since the ultimate goal was to preserve the status quo. Once survival was ensured, the elite focused on political reconstruction, admitting no further changes as of 1997.  That year the ccp Congress sealed Cuba’s political return to the past. Pérez-Stable examines how the Great Battle of Ideas –which was nothing more than a nationalistic campaign– started, and how did the constitutional reform of June 2002 that stated the irrevocability of socialism finally take place.  The Commander’s successors, however, will face some challenges. The first relates to political culture, since the Cuban people’s well-being must become a focal point of politics, and discourse will have to include terms such as “equal opportunities” and “ratio between productivity and social welfare.”  The second challenge concerns the normalization of Cuba’s relationship with the United States, which implies abandoning a mindset that has prevailed since the 19th century.

Jorge F. Pérez-López, El interminable periodo especial de la economía cubana.

Pérez-López reviews the Cuban economy since 1990, when the worst crisis in Cuba’s history –the so-called “special period in times of peace”– broke out as a result of the socialist bloc’s dissolution.  Pérez-López explores the impact of the crisis on different segments of Cuban economy and the measures implemented by the government to revert the situation.  Some of these measures included: legalizing the possession and use of foreign currencies, allowing self-employment, establishing agricultural cooperatives, modifying fiscal laws, developing agricultural markets, promoting foreign investment, and bank reform. The article also analyzes the outcomes of those measures and stresses the positive trend in economic growth since 1994.  Pérez-López argues, however, that reforms failed to restore the income and consumption levels that Cubans enjoyed at the end of the 1980’s, and they were also incapable of setting the basis for a future sustainable economic growth.  In addition, Cuba’s economic prospects were further undermined by the deceleration of global economy, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, Russia’s retreat from the Lourdes base, and the hurricane Michelle.  Pérez-López concludes that the Cuban regime has not worked out a reform project aimed at improving economic efficiency and further harmonizing it with the global economy.  In addition, the implementation of politically sensitive measures –such as, restructuring state firms, authorizing small business, and reorganizing the labor market– has been postponed since they would exacerbate unemployment and reduce control over the state’s production assets.  The changes already implemented are solely intended at tackling the crisis, but lack a long-term vision.

Damián J. Fernández, La disidencia en Cuba: entre la seducción y la normalización.

The article looks at the history of Cuban dissidence since 1959 and the legal framework within which it has operated.  According to Fernández, while being a heterogeneous group, dissidents share the goals of defending the individual’s civil rights and fighting the status quo.  In fact, the opposition developed from the revolutionary ranks themselves –when Castro’s regime became more radical– and has ever since adopted different ideological hues, ranging from supporters of center-left socialism to democrat conservatives; from those who base their legitimacy on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to those who endorse the nationalistic political thinking stemming from José Martí.  There are roughly 350 associations currently operating, which include human rights groups, proto-political parties, labor associations, and cultural and other specific-target organizations.  As Fernández explores the evolution of dissidence –whose main representatives are human rights groups– he identifies various strategies adopted by the movement and the Cuban government.  As to the former, Fernández stresses its increasingly successful projection at the international level.  On the other hand, the government has reacted by using the human rights discourse, promoting foreign campaigns to give a positive image of Cuba and, of course, by repressing the opposition.  In both cases, though, it is undeniable that Cuban domestic developments are not isolated from the global context.  Documents produced by dissidents reveal a tolerant and inclusive stance.  Fernández concludes, therefore, that dissidence could play a relevant role in transforming the Cuban political culture that might lead to the establishment of a democratic civil society.

Alejandro Portes, La máquina política cubano-estadounidense: reflexiones sobre su origen y permanencia.

Portes argues that the Cuban exile community in Miami became very influential as a result of the way in which it reshaped the city and gained political power both at the local and national levels.  As the exiles realized they would not regain the economic status they had enjoyed back in Cuba –or the power–, they decided to secure a privileged position in Miami.  However, Portes identifies three paradoxes that characterize Miami’s “machine.”  Firstly, despite their success Cubans have not been assimilated into Miami’s society, but have remained apart and have produced a political economy of their own.  The second paradox refers to the Cuban establishment’s image as a radical group, out of tune with the post-Cold War realities. This is the paradox of intransigence. Third, the legitimacy paradox explains how the militant agenda of Cuban-American leaders offers the Cuban government an invaluable symbolic resource since it allows the latter to embody the nationalistic resistance to U.S. aggression.  Additionally, Portes describes the various exchanges that took place between Cuban exiles and U.S. politicians, which allowed the former to obtain political leverage.  Solidarity among members of the Cuban community and the regular performance of rituals may explain the endurance of the community, despite the fact that the feeling of being a victim of the Cuban regime becomes increasingly distant.  Indeed, as Portes reckons, Miami’s “machine” is confronting a generational problem, since young Cuban Americans are less ideological and belligerent.  Ironically, however, a crucial change within the Miami community must be preceded by change in Cuba.

Ana Covarrubias Velasco, La política mexicana hacia Cuba a principios de siglo: de la no intervención a la protección de los derechos humanos.

According to Covarrubias the most important change in Mexican foreign policy towards Cuba in the last twelve years has been the abandonment of a key component of the bilateral relation –non-intervention– on behalf of democracy and human rights promotion. Covarrubias considers the governments of Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo as a transition period, marked by a tension between continuity and change in Mexican foreign policy.  Continuity, as expressed by the endorsement of non-intervention in Cuban affairs, was evident in the Mexican government’s approach vis-à-vis the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Laws, and all through the Ibero-American Summits until 1999. Conversely, change was evident in the meetings between Mexican officials and Cuban exiles or dissidents in Cuba.  Mexico’s domestic context during the Zedillo’s sexenio, characterized by “democratization”, may explain the drive towards change –evident also in the government’s discourse by 1999.  The new Mexican Cuban policy has been more evident with Vicente Fox administration.  The Mexican government has either abstained or voted in favor of resolutions inviting the Cuban government to respect human rights and civil liberties, and has adopted a language consistent with an overall foreign policy that privileges democracy and human rights promotion.  In this context, the first reaction of the Cuban government was a series of messages that stressed the validity of non-intervention, but it then became more aggressive, as when Castro decided to make public a telephone conversation he had had with president Fox in relation to the Conference on Financing for Development that took place in the Mexican city of Monterrey.  Covarrubias concludes that despite a visible transformation in Mexico’ foreign policy, there is a line of continuity in one aspect of the bilateral relationship: Cuba still holds a symbolic value for Mexico as it represents an opportunity to promote Mexico’s democratic image.

Cristina Warren, La política de Canadá hacia Cuba: evolución del compromiso constructivo.

In view of Cuba’s circumstances after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes that took place in the international system, the Canadian government of Jean Chrétien sought to contribute to what he deemed an inevitable transformation of Cuba into an open economy and a political system with representative institutions, and respectful of human rights. According to Warren, this policy of constructive engagement resulted from the Liberal government’s new hemispheric strategy of strengthening ties with Latin America and increasing Canada’s autonomy vis-à-vis U.S. foreign policy.  Additionally, a policy of constructive engagement was viable due to both a positive attitude on the part of Canadian public and the absence of an exile community ready to prevent a rapprochement with the Cuban government. Constructive engagement included giving diplomatic support to Cuba, promoting trade and investment with the island, and intensifying cultural exchanges between both countries.  Moreover, Canada offered a series of economic and social aid, involving ngos and churches to advise the Cuban government on issues concerning economic reform, human rights and governance, among other things.  However, Castro’s reluctance to open the economy and the political system set the limits of constructive engagement: facing a public opinion that questioned the effectiveness of the policy, the Canadian government reconsidered its position and reduced some of the assistance and exchange programs with the island, as well as Canada’s diplomatic support.  Warren concludes that Cuba is no longer considered a priority or a particular concern by Canadian government, firms or even ngos, and the island’s ranking within Canada’s foreign policy will depend on the significance given to the Latin American hemisphere as a whole.

Claude Heller, La cuestión cubana en los foros multilaterales.

Although the Cuban government was excluded from the oas in 1962, it still provokes debate within the oas, other regional fora and the un.  After a brief historical review of the Cuban case within the oas, Heller analyzes how this issue re-emerged in the agenda during the 1990’s.  Latin American countries were forced by the Helms-Burton Act to take a position on this matter and both the Rio Group and the oas issued statements and resolutions condemning the extra-territorial enforcement of laws and endorsing trade and investment freedom in the hemisphere.  On the other hand, the Secretary General, César Gaviria, suggested that the Inter-American community should play a more dynamic role in Cuba’s economic and political opening.  The un became also a debate scenario when in 1987 the United States presented a resolution condemning the Cuban government for the violation of human rights in the island at the Human Rights Commission. Different countries have submitted this resolution each year since then.  Cuba, on its part, has also used the un forum to denounce extra-territorial legislation.  In general, the consideration of the Cuban case by multilateral agencies has resulted in divisions among member countries as to whether or not the Cuban government should be “pressed” to open the country.  Heller argues that these debates are in fact a reflection of the conflict between the United States and Cuba, but the statements and resolutions that have been adopted have failed to change both countries’ positions.  In other words, the impasse between Havana and Washington is also prevalent at those fora.

Mark Falcoff, Presente y futuro en las relaciones Estados Unidos-Cuba: un ejercicio de análisis y especulación.

The lack of formal diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States for forty years deserves an explanation.  Mark Falcoff’s article elucidates this odd situation based on five aspects which he considers to have defined U.S. policy towards Cuba: inertia, property claims, historic grudges, basic values, and domestic politics.  Inertia refers to the long-lasting U.S. confrontational policy toward Cuba despite the establishment of Interest Sections in both Washington and Havana, and the signature of agreements between the two governments.  Secondly, property claims will represent a hurdle –aggravated by the Helms-Burton Act– as long as a compensation formula acceptable to both parties is not reached.  Historic grudges are obviously the result of an extremely complex relationship between the two countries well before the 1959 revolution and that has been somehow recuperated by Castro’s government.  Basic values are still a source of conflict: what is at stake is not only a clash between communism and democracy, human rights and free markets, but also U.S. hegemony. Finally, the Cuban-American community represents undoubtedly a key element to understand domestic politics.  This community, however, as well as the American public and even some segments of U.S. government have gradually adopted a more flexible view towards Cuba.  Inevitably, Cuba and the United States will have to normalize relations in the future, and Falcoff concludes by speculating about this eventuality.

Susan Kaufmann Purcell, La Ley Helms-Burton y el embargo estadounidense contra Cuba.

Purcell looks at the most common approaches to the U.S. embargo on Cuba, in particular the Helms-Burton Law.  There are, first, those who argue that the embargo has failed in its goal of overthrowing Fidel Castro thus favoring a constructive engagement policy.  If the embargo was to be lifted, the Cuban society would get to know U.S. values and would stop believing in its government. A further diversification of the Cuban economy would also follow.  On the other hand, those in favor of sanctions believe that a constructive engagement would in fact strengthen the Cuban dictatorship, as it would provide Castro the resources to survive and prevent the Cuban people from rising up against his government.  Purcell claims that each crisis in Cuban economy has been followed by a limited opening, whereas in times of good economic performance Castro’s government has embarked on foreign ventures against U.S. interests.  According to Purcell it is ultimately problematic to evaluate these two approaches due to the fact that there is a lack of reliable data and, even if they were available, the debate is so deeply permeated by ideological concerns that the same set of data would lead to different conclusions. She considers, however, that the Helms-Burton Law will be maintained in the foreseeable future, and that president Bush is very unlikely to loosen his policy towards Cuba after September the 11th, 2001, given Castro’s links with both the farc and the president of Venezuela.  Both the embargo and the Helms-Burton Law have failed to overthrow Castro or produce an economic breakdown in the island, but they have served as permanent constraints against the Cuban regime.

Joaquín Roy, Las dos leyes Helms-Burton: contraste de la actitud de los Estados Unidos ante la Unión Europea y ante Cuba.

This article tackles two key issues: the us-eu Understanding on the Helms-Burton Law, and what Roy calls the Helms-Burton Doctrine.  As to the former, Roy stresses that while the eu has denounced the Cuban government for violating human rights in the island, it has also rejected the unilateral actions taken by the United States, such as the Helms-Burton Law.  When the eu decided to denounce the law at the wto, the United States replied that the accusation was unacceptable since the nature of the issue was not commercial but political.  However, the United States and the eu reached an Understanding whereby the us government would require the Congress to loosen article III and remove article IV of the Law, while the eu agreed to discourage investments in the expropriated properties, support Cuba’s democratization process and withdraw its claim at the wto, among other things. The Understanding did not go without criticisms both in the United States and the European Union, but it soon became a model of diplomatic negotiations, which were feasible due to the fact that Cuba was not so important an issue as to start out a trade war between the two giants.  Roy also argues that the Helms-Burton Act may be construed as a doctrine since it includes a series of political requirements to lift the embargo that actually entail a blueprint for Cuba’s future government.  These requirements include: forbidding all members of the Castro family from holding any position in the government; holding open elections with the participation of independent political parties, monitored by the un and the oas, and establishing an independent judiciary.  On the grounds of the political leverage that the us government intends to have on Cuba, Roy draws a continuity line that goes back to the Monroe Doctrine and the Platt Amendment, and argues that the Helms-Burton Law represents for Cuba, in fact, a domestic political issue.