# The Persian Gulf's predominance endangered?

Amrita Sen, 13 November 2013



## The sudden burst of shale was viewed as a key threat to OPEC

### US oil production mb/d



### North Dakota oil production mb/d




US oil production is scaling record highs, supported by shale output

Bakken and Eagle Ford plays have seen their output soar and are the two most prolific plays of the US



## Through higher non-OPEC supplies and lower demand for oil



The growth in US shale had fuelled widespread optimism about global shale plays creating an abundance of oil and gas supplies; and resulting in widespread substitution of gas in the transportation sector, which would lower demand for oil as well



## But oil prices are still above \$100

### OPEC basket price \$/barrel



Despite the growth in US tight oils output, Brent prices have averaged above \$100 for the last three years

### Saudi crude output mb/d




And has required above 10 mb/d of production from Saudi Arabia to balance the market




### And the world is still reliant on OPEC's oil

### Quarterly OPEC oil output mb/d



### IEA's call on OPEC crude mb/d




OPEC crude has remained high by historical standards at above 30 mb/d

The call on OPEC crude has been systematically underestimated by key agencies such as the IEA




## Non-OPEC supplies: it is not all about shale

### US oil production, y/y change mb/d



US oil production is scaling record highs, supported by shale output

Rest of non-OPEC oil production, y/y change mb/d




But the rest of non-OPEC production has been weak, declining sharply throughout 2011 and 2012 and into 2013




## Centres of growth in the past have started to disappoint significantly

### Brazilian oil production, y/y change mb/d



Brazilian oil production has been extremely weak, due to high declines at old oilfields

### IEA's Brazilian oil production forecasts mb/d




Canada and Brazil, two centres of great promise, have seen their output forecasts cut sharply due to various constraints

Source: ANP, Socar, Bloomberg, Kazmunaigas, Energy Aspects analysis




## Outside North America, crude output has fallen for the last 3 years

### North Sea oil production, y/y change mb/d



FSU oil production, y/y change mb/d



UK and Norwegian production is on double digit declines, crippled by ageing fields and infrastructure

FSU output, apart from Russia, has also been affected by sharp declines and technical problems

Source: ANP, Socar, Bloomberg, Kazmunaigas, Energy Aspects analysis



## Spending has risen but production is flat

### Breakdown of key E&P profitability metrics \$/barrel

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	10-yr CAGR
WTI Brent	26.1 <b>25.0</b>	31.0 <b>28.5</b>	41.5 <b>38.0</b>	56.7 <b>55.3</b>	66.2 <b>66.1</b>	72.4 <b>72.7</b>	99.8 <b>98.5</b>	62.1 <b>62.7</b>	79.6 <b>80.3</b>	95.1 <b>110.9</b>	94.1 <b>111.7</b>	13.7% <b>16.1%</b>
Revenue	20.6	24.3	30.0	41.1	47.9	51.8	68.0	43.1	52.9	68.2	68.0	12.7%
Production Costs	(3.6)	(3.7)	(4.2)	(5.0)	(6.0)	(7.2)	(8.3)	(8.5)	(8.9)	(11.0)	(12.0)	12.8%
Exploration Expense	(8.0)	(8.0)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.5)	(1.8)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(2.1)	(2.3)	(2.7)	13.4%
DD&A	(4.5)	(4.5)	(5.0)	(5.7)	(6.9)	(8.1)	(9.7)	(9.8)	(10.6)	(10.9)	(13.1)	11.3%
Other	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.5)	(2.5)	(2.2)	(2.6)	(2.5)	(2.2)	(1.4)	(3.5)	(2.8)	5.6%
Income Tax	(3.2)	(4.2)	(6.0)	(9.7)	(14.2)	(14.1)	(19.7)	(8.9)	(13.0)	(17.9)	(20.2)	20.3%
Net Income	4.6	7.4	8.9	13.1	13.5	13.2	18.4	8.1	12.9	15.6	13.5	11.5%
Finding Costs	1.2	0.9	6.3	2.5	5.4	8.4	2.0	2.3	3.7	3.7	6.2	17.6%
F&D Costs	7.1	6.9	19.6	17.6	18.4	26.5	10.5	11.4	23.7	22.2	30.9	15.8%
Exploration Intensity	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.4	2.1	2.5	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.9	4.9	16.5%
Development Intensity	5.6	6.1	6.4	8.1	10.1	11.5	14.0	13.6	15.0	18.2	22.9	15.1%


Analysis of the majors indicates continuing sharp cost inflation in the upstream oil sector. Whilst Brent prices increased to \$111.7 in 2012, net income per barrel actually fell y/y by 13%. The increase in costs supports longer-term oil prices around \$100.

Source: Company data, Energy Aspects analysis




## Costs of extraction and decline rates are much higher today and rising

# Ultra-deepwater rig day rates \$000 per day



Exploration and production costs have risen substantially over the past eight years

## US Gulf of Mexico decline rates




Decline rates have stepped up across key basins such as North Sea, Brazil and US GoM, further adding to costs

Source: Company data, MOEMRE, US Department of Interior, Energy Aspects analysis




## And rising exploration costs likely to support \$90 floor

#### Majors' liquids output, CAPEX and income Index based on nominal dollars



Net income vs oil price \$/barrel




As decline rates have stepped up and terrains have gotten more challenging, oil companies have failed to grow output Net income per barrel (11.5%) has risen by far less than oil prices (16.1%) over the last 10 years due to rising costs

Source: EIA, Reuters, Energy Aspects analysis



## OPEC still has the lowest cost of production globally

### Average cost curve for the oil market \$/barrel




Shale plays lie at the higher end of the non-OPEC marginal cost curve, as infrastructure build-outs, decline rates and high levels of rig activity keep costs high




## Moreover, is shale the right quality of oil?

## Crude oils by quality characteristics mb/d



The crude oil quality of shale plays is super light, with vast amounts of condensate blended in with crude

## Declines at shale plays



Break-even prices required by producers are above \$80 per barrel, in part due to extremely steep decline rates




## When global refining capacity is biased towards processing heavy crudes

# Net refining capacity additions mb/d

	2013	2014	2015	Total
Africa	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.19
Asia	0.84	0.44	2.44	3.71
Europe	(0.45)	(0.05)		(0.50)
FSU	0.16	0.05	0.16	0.37
Middle East	0.40	0.96	0.16	1.52
Latin America	0.05	0.40	0.18	0.62
North America	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.12
Global	1.10	1.87	3.05	6.03

# US refining capacity additions thousand b/d




Significant capacity addition in the non-OECD, all biased towards processing heavy crudes

USGC refining capacity has significant upgrading capacity in an attempt to capture high light-heavy differentials




## With growth in shale supported by rising debt

# Continental Resources, balance sheet output vs debt



### Cumulative debt vs production

35 US independent companies




Companies have been able to growth production only with huge debts. This is unsustainable in a rising interest rate environment. For instance, Continental was borrowing \$840 million as of February 2013, meaning a 1% increase in interest rates would result in increased annual interest expense of approximately \$8.4 million and a \$5.2 million decrease annual net income.

Source: Company reports, Energy Aspects analysis




## And OPEC outside the GCC also under significant pressure

# Libyan oil production mb/d



## Nigerian oil production mb/d




Ongoing unrest is significantly curtailing Libyan production

While increasing oil theft is capping Nigerian output



## As a result of which Saudi Arabia has had to fill the gap

### Iranian oil production mb/d



OPEC output ex Saudi Arabia mb/d




There are various political and technical obstacles to the return of Iranian production to pre-sanction levels

OPEC output from North African nations and from Iran and Iraq have been mired by problems



## OPEC production marred by geopolitical risks and high declines




The geopolitical backdrop of several key Middle Eastern countries remains extremely fragile. Syria remains unresolved and worsening, Libya's political backdrop remains extremely fragile and Iraq is getting worse with problems between Baghdad and Kurdistan and sectarian violence at the highest levels in five years, partly due to spillover from Syria



## Saudi Arabia is the only country with meaningful spare capacity

# Global spare capacity mb/d




Spare capacities in Libya, Iran and Nigeria are not available to the market as they are dependent on the political stability of the countries. Saudi Arabia continues to act as the primary swing producer in the market at times of market tightness.




## But there are two headaches for Saudi Arabia: Iraq and domestic demand

# Iraqi production forecast mb/d



Iraq and Saudi OSPs to Asia \$/barrel




Iraqi production has struggled to grow lately and although challenges remain, growth can pick up substantially

But discounted Iraqi crude could lead to the loss of market share, a problem in the longer run




## Saudi domestic demand is soaring, potentially eating into exports

### Saudi crude burn mb/d



Rising domestic consumption has meant higher crude, diesel

### Saudi crude exports mb/d



As a result, crude exports tend to take a dip over the summer, a trend that can continue through to 2020

Source: Energy Aspects analysis



and fuel oil burn in the summer

### Price forecasts

### Energy Aspects Brent price forecasts (2013 - 2015) \$/barrel

		Brent	WTI	differential
Q1	actual	118.4	103.0	15.4
Q2	actual	108.8	93.4	15.4
Q3	actual	109.4	92.2	17.2
Q4	actual	110.1	88.2	21.9
2012	actual	111.7	94.2	17.5
Q1	actual	112.6	94.4	18.2
Q2	actual	103.3	94.1	9.2
Q3	actual	109.7	105.8	3.9
Q4	forecast	108	99	9
2013	forecast	108	98	10
2014	forecast	105	100	5
2015	forecast	108	101	7

#### **Upside risk**

- Supply outages spanning both OPEC and non-OPEC countries; shale disappointing
- Geopolitical risks surrounding Iraq, Nigeria, Syria and Libya all pose significant upside risks
- Demand recovery in the OECD being currently underestimated

#### Downside risk

- Renewed weakness in Europe; US government default
- Derailment of Chinese recovery

#### Long-term expectations

 A fairly well balanced market persists for now, but only while demand growth remains weak. Prices remain high as the cost of exploration has increased substantially. If supply shortfalls mount as demand picks up, prices have substantial room to rise in the medium-term

Source: Bloomberg (actuals), Energy Aspects analysis; long term forecasts are in real terms





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